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Brigadier General George S. Greene’s position on Culp’s Hill during the Battle of Gettysburg is arguably the
crucial lynchpin of July 2, 1863. Had this position at the barb of the fishhook defensive line fallen,
Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his army would then have been positioned to take Cemetery Hill,
thus breaking the curve of the hook on the Union right. This most likely would have sent the Union into
retreat, leaving the direct route to Washington unguarded. Fortunately, valiant efforts were made by men like
Generals George S. Greene and Henry H. Lockwood in order to preserve the Union Army’s possession of the
hill and, as a result, preserve the Union itself. While leaders distinguished themselves during the Battle of
Gettysburg with exceptional decision-making and ingenuity, the battle for Culp’s Hill also embodied the
personal cost these decisions made, as evidenced by the experience of Marylanders who literally fought their
neighbors. [excerpt]
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Culp’s Hill: Key to Union Success at Gettysburg
Ryan Donnelly
Historical Essay
Brigadier General George S. Greene’s position on Culp’s Hill 
during the Battle of Gettysburg is arguably the crucial lynchpin of July 2, 
1863.  Had this position at the barb of the fishhook defensive line fallen, 
Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his army would then have been 
positioned to take Cemetery Hill, thus breaking the curve of the hook on 
the Union right.  This most likely would have sent the Union into retreat, 
leaving the direct route to Washington unguarded. (Diagram 1) Fortunately, 
valiant efforts were made by men like Generals George S. Greene and Henry 
H. Lockwood in order to preserve the Union Army’s possession of the 
hill and, as a result, preserve the Union itself. While leaders distinguished 
themselves during the Battle of Gettysburg with exceptional decision-
making and ingenuity, the battle for Culp’s Hill also embodied the personal 
cost these decisions made, as evidenced by the experience of Marylanders 
who literally fought their neighbors.  
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Culp’s Hill was under siege on July 1, 2, and 3, throughout the 
entirety of the Battle of Gettysburg. It was a strategic position, both in 
its proximity to the Union supply lines along the Baltimore Pike, and in 
the defense of the hook along nearby Cemetery Hill. The Union troops 
were under the command of Major General Henry W. Slocum while the 
Confederates were part of Major General Edward Johnson’s Third division.  
Lt. General Richard S. Ewell’s inaction on July 1 gave the five upstate New 
York brigades under Brigadier General George Sears “Pap” Greene, holding 
Culp’s Hill, much needed time to better their defenses.152 They had been 
152 William A. Frassanito, Gettysburg: A Journey In Time (Gettysburg: Thomas Publications, 1975): 
129-130.
Diagram 1
(Source: Wikimedia)
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left undermanned by the decision to move several divisions to reinforce 
the western side of the hook. One key aspect of the Union defense was the 
implementation of earthen breastworks along the north ridge of the hill from 
the base of the hill, near Spangler’s Spring, up the hill towards the north. 
The breastworks were the idea of General Greene, a West Point engineering 
graduate. On July 2, 1863, Greene was in charge of the Union troops on the 
eastern slope of Culp’s hill. The breastworks were completed by noon, and 
stretched across the hillside.153 Colonel Charles Candy of the 66th Ohio then 
formed a support line running southwest from the right rear of Greene’s 
137th New York, facing the lower hill.154 The implementation of Candy’s 
earthworks would appear useless at first because General Thomas Kane’s 
second brigade arrived and took a defensive position upon lower Culp’s 
hill, thus putting Candy’s men behind the frontline. Later these defenses 
became crucial as a fallback position, as the Union forces would later retreat 
from lower Culp’s hill. By noon on July 2nd, just over 8,600 Union troops 
defended Culp’s Hill in a line stretching about a half mile from the north 
crest of the hill to Spangler’s meadow.155 The building of breastworks was a 
key decision in giving the Union men a psychological as well as a strategic 
advantage over the Confederate soldiers. While the battle was delayed, 
trench building gave the men something to do to keep them busy, and the 
sound of their construction was noted to provoke anxiety in the CSA troops 
waiting down the hill. Lt. Randolph McKim of General Steuart’s Brigade 
reported that despite some skirmishing by the 1st North Carolina earlier in the 
153 John A. Archer, Culp’s Hill at Gettysburg: “The Mountain Trembled” (Gettysburg: Thomas 
Publications): 22-23.
154 Ibid., 25.
155 Ibid., 26.
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morning, the regiment remained mostly in waiting, listening with growing 
apprehension. He said: 
Much of my time after nightfall had been spent on the front picket 
line, listening to the busy strokes of Union picks and shovels on the 
line, to the rumble and the tramp of their troops as they were hurried 
forward by Union commanders and placed in position. There was 
therefore, no difficulty in divining the scene that would break on our 
view with the coming dawn. I did not hesitate to say to both Ewell 
and Early that a line of heavy earthworks and guns with infantry 
ranks behind them, would frown upon us at daylight. I expressed the 
opinion that even at that hour, 2 o’clock A. M., by a concentrated and 
vigorous night assault we could carry those heights, and that if we 
waited until morning it would cost us 10,000 men to take them.156
The breastworks were formed by filling in the space between large 
boulders with earth and stones along the ridge, felling trees to reinforce the 
breastworks thus providing protection from gunfire as well as a lookout and 
place to shoot between logs. One Union soldier, Jesse Jones of the 60th New 
York recounted,  “Culp’s Hill was covered with woods: so all the material 
needful were at our disposal. Right and left the men felled the trees, and 
blocked them up into a close log fence.”157 Although some combatants of the 
Civil War era considered breastworks a sign of cowardice, the use of these 
fortifications would greatly reduce the number of casualties in this battle.  
Early in the battle, the breastworks gave the thinly spread and outnumbered 
Union troops a definite advantage in obscuring their true numbers, as well 
as providing shelter from the assault. Under General Greene’s leadership, a 
system of rotating all available regiments to the front guaranteed that troops 
were reloaded and ready to engage the enemy.  When they exhausted their 
156  Randolph McKim, General Steuart’s Brigade, Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 40, 258.
157  Archer, Culp’s Hill at Gettysburg, 25.
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ammunition, they dropped back to allow the next fresh regiment to begin 
firing helped to greatly increase the rate of fire of Union troops. 
Another key element that led to the Union victory was the 
effectiveness of Union response to Confederate artillery. While observing 
the Union line, Johnson realized that the Union cannons on Cemetery 
Hill appeared formidable. The Confederates would have to count on the 
effectiveness of Ewell’s artillery.  Around 4:00 p.m. on July 2, Confederate 
cannons opened fire upon Cemetery Ridge from artillery positions on 
Seminary Ridge and Benner’s Hill. During this time, Union commander 
Major General John W. Geary saw the opportunity to launch an attack en 
enfilade (attacking an enemy along its long axis) against the Confederates.158 
The Third North Carolina and the Second Maryland also received 
“enfilading fire from Green’s New York Brigade, which was posted in an 
angle of the works.”159 
Shortly after Geary had called guns upon the crest of the hill and 
had begun to attack the enemy, Confederate cannons turned their attention 
towards Culp’s Hill.  Although Geary’s tactics had drawn cannon fire upon 
Culp’s Hill, it was especially damaging to Carpenter’s Allegheny Battery and 
the Chesapeake Artillery. Another problem that arose for the Confederate 
gunners, in particular upon Benner’s Hill, was that Union Marksmen easily 
identified their silhouettes and casualties began to further rise. Eventually 
after coming under fire from both Union artillery and marksmen fire, 
Latimer’s battalion on Benner’s Hill was given permission to withdraw, 
which relieved the Union line of artillery fire from that direction.160 
158  Archer, Culp’s Hill at Gettysburg, 79-80.
159  WW Goldsborough, The Maryland Line in the Confederate Army, 104.
160  Ibid., 37.
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Even before the main fighting had begun, Major General Edward 
Johnson put himself at a great disadvantage. Johnson’s advancing force was 
weakened when he gave the order to the Stonewall Brigade to remain on 
the Hanover Road in the event that a Union threat would attack from the 
southern end of the battlefield. This decision would put Johnson down some 
1,300 men from his original attacking force which could have played a key 
role in loosening the Union hold on Culp’s Hill.161 Without these needed 
men, the arduous journey would become only more difficult. To add to the 
rugged terrain of boulders and fallen timber that hindered their ascent up 
the slope, the Confederate forces were then also engaged in heavy skirmish 
action.  Skirmishers from Greene’s division greatly slowed the Confederates 
advance; Sgt. M. L. Olmsted from the 102nd New York recounted: “we in the 
heavy timber made every tree and rock a veritable battlefield, and probably 
during the whole war a more stubborn skirmish fight was never waged.”162 
With the efficient use of the Union skirmishers, the advancing confederates 
were reduced even before reaching the line of earthworks.
 
161  Archer, Culp’s Hill at Gettysburg, 105.
162  Ibid, 47.
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It is important to note that Brigadier General George H. Steuart’s 
1st Maryland division was at the southern end of the Confederate line.  This 
put them in direct contact with the 1st Maryland Eastern Shore Infantry 
of Lockwood’s Union brigade from Maryland on lower Culp’s Hill near 
Spangler’s Spring on July 2.  This situation literally pitted neighbor against 
neighbor, with the opposing colors being carried by cousins. The meaning 
of the Civil War had become a metaphoric reality in their engagement on 
Culp’s Hill.  Steuart’s Marylanders did not fare well, but according to Union 
Colonel James Wallace “our old friends and acquaintances” (from the 
Breastworks on Culp’s Hill
(Source: Wikimedia)
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Confederate battalion) were “sorrowfully gathered up… and tenderly cared 
for” by Lockwood’s Marylanders after the battle.
The fighting went into the night on July 2. Lieutenant General 
Jubal Early’s division advanced up the northeastern slope and in the process 
captured several batteries.  This small victory was short-lived. Colonel 
Samuel Carroll and the Gibraltar Brigade were able to retake Rickett’s 
Battery and repel the Confederate infantry from the hill. At the end of July 
2nd, the Confederates held lower Culp’s Hill, but had failed to take any other 
part of the hill. The orders on July 3rd remained unchanged - control the 
hill. Their inability to adjust their strategy to capture the hill would become 
apparent on July 3rd when they would be completely repulsed from the hill. 
Even some officers of the C.S.A. believed the order to charge the hill again 
July 3 to be a suicide mission. Before starting the charge, Captain William 
H. Murray addressed his men telling them, “Goodbye, it is not likely that we 
shall meet again.”163 This prophetic statement would be fulfilled as he led his 
men up Culp’s Hill to try to take the earthworks once again. He was mortally 
wounded in the attempt and died on the field.
Major General Edward “Allegheny” Johnson led the Confederate 
attack on the western side of Culp’s Hill.  He had a large numerical 
advantage on July 1 over the Union that did not exist at any other point 
during the battle.  He did not capitalize on his ability to break into the fish 
hook on southern Culp’s Hill. Johnson’s error lay in the fact that he did not 
adequately focus his resources on capturing the seven acre meadow (later 
known as the Pardee Field) running between lower Culp’s Hill and the 
163  Daniel Carroll Toomey, Marylanders at Gettysburg (Baltimore: Toomey Press, 1994).
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Baltimore Pike which the Confederates would have to cross to advance, thus 
putting the men on open ground and subject to fire. 
The battle, which ensued on Culp’s Hill on July 3, involved 
22,000 troops, and one fifth of all the ammunition expended in the battle.164 
Union guns on Cemetery Hill aided the assault while the Confederates had 
Ewell’s artillery on Benner’s Hill. Geary enfiladed the enemy with their 
own cannons.165 Despite the Confederates’ grueling efforts over seven hours 
on July 3 to capture Culp’s Hill, they were defeated by eleven o’clock in 
the morning by the outnumbered, but entrenched, Union forces in some of 
the most intense, and close-quarter fighting of the entire battle.  One of the 
victim’s of the battle, Wesley Culp, was a grandson of the original landowner 
of Culp’s Hill. He had joined the Virginia Second Infantry (Stonewall 
Brigade) and had just returned from town after visiting his sick mother when 
he rejoined his brigade and was killed on Culp’s Hill.166
Without first capturing Culp’s Hill, the Confederate plan to take 
Cemetery Hill from the east could never have come to fruition.  Thus, as 
long as Cemetery Hill was held by Union forces, the opportunity remained 
for them to win the Gettysburg Campaign.  If the Union had lost Cemetery 
Hill it is likely that they would have been forced to retreat, leaving 
Washington, D.C. exposed, and the Union demoralized.  Fortunately for the 
safety of the United States capitol and the war effort, men like George Sears 
Greene and the Twelfth Corps courageously defended Culp’s Hill. Although 
the struggles at Culp’s Hill were significant in achieving the Union victory 
164 “Culp’s Hill, Then and Now: An Interview with Charlie Fennel,” http://www.civilwar.org 
(accessed October 22, 2011).
165 Archer, Culp’s Hill at Gettysburg, 79-80.
166 Stephen Sears, Gettysburg (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2003): 246.
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at Gettysburg, it does not seem to hold the same fascination as Devil’s Den, 
Little Round Top, and Pickett’s Charge.  This may be for the simple fact that 
George Sears Greene was a man who did not highly publicize his role in the 
actions of July 2, 1863.  
 The surreal horrors of war were epitomized by the Marylanders 
who came face to face on the battlefield. Although these men fought 
on opposite sides, they still realized the human cost of the battle. This 
horror was all too real to the battle participants, but was as yet unknown 
to the American public. It was the accounts of these soldiers, as well as 
the photographers and visitors to the battlefield in the weeks following 
Gettysburg that would shock the conscience of America. 
Bibliography
Archer, John A. Culp’s Hill at Gettysburg:“The Mountain Trembled,” Gettysburg: 
Thomas Publications, 2002.
America’s Civil War Magazine. “Confederate General Richard Ewell’s Failure on the 
Heights.” Civil War Trust. http://www.civilwar.org. (accessed October 22, 2011).
“Culp’s Hill, Then and Now: An Interview with Charlie Fennel.” http://www.civilwar.org. 
(accessed October 22, 2011).
Frassanito, William A. Gettysburg: A Journey In Time. Gettysburg: Thomas Publications, 
1975.
Goldsborough, W.W. “The Maryland Line in the Confederate Army.” 1876.
McKim, Randolph. “General Steuart’s Brigade.” Southern Historical Society Papers. 
Volume 40: 253-300. 1915.
Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill. Chapel Hill, NC: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1993.
Sears, Stephen. Gettysburg. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. 
Toomey, Daniel Carroll. Marylanders at Gettysburg. Baltimore: Toomey Press, 1994.
